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Abstract 
 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is a popular qualitative 
research interpretive method aiming to explore the meaning of individual 
experiences in relation to understanding human interpretation. Gadamer 
identifies that authentic engagement with reading requires awareness of the 
inter-subjective nature of understanding in order to promote a reflective 
engagement with the text. The main concepts of Gadamer’s view of reading 
and understanding are explored in this paper in relation to interpreting text. 
Concepts such as; inter-subjectivity, Being, authenticity, fore-structure, pre-
suppositions, prejudice, temporality and history help to enhance health and 
social science researchers’ understanding of his theory and its application. 
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Introduction 
Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) was an influential German 
philosopher of the twentieth century, inspiring a variety of 
scholastic disciplines from aesthetics to theology. In suggesting 
understanding  was interpretation and vice versa, Gadamer 
identifies language acting as the medium for understanding 
and a means of sharing the complexities of human experience 
(Gadamer 2004a). From the ground breaking work of his 
teacher and friend Martin Heidegger, Gadamer wrote about 
human subjectivity and developing a critical and dialogical Paul Regan / Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics 
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approach to philosophical hermeneutics in his magnus opus 
Truth and Method (2004a) first published in 1960.  
 
The purpose of this paper 
This paper aims to articulate Gadamer’s work in relation to 
reading, understanding and interpretation for health and social 
science researchers’. Gadamer’s key concepts are of particular 
concern for qualitative researchers’ intending to use 
philosophical hermeneutics for interpreting research 
participants’ narrative and findings. The researchers’ own 
experience of reading and understanding are important when 
relating concepts of pre-supposition (bias, fore-structure), inter-
subjectivity, authenticity (being reflective), temporality (time 
affecting understanding/ emotion), tradition and history 
(culture) to interpreting the written word. These concepts are 
significant because of the central interpretive relationship of 
the researcher within the qualitative research process. The 
terms researcher and interpreter are used interchangeably due 
to the cyclical nature of interpretation. 
 
Hermeneutic phenomenology 
Gadamer’s concepts will be defined to make explicit the 
working terms in use. Phenomenology underpins the 
philosophy of Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics (2004a). 
Firstly,  the word phenomenology comes from  the  Kantian 
phenomenon meaning ‘‘…that which shows itself in itself…” 
when entities become manifest as the first signification of the 
word shows itself (Heidegger 2003, 51). First, the semblance of 
what phenomenology shows conceptualises the word and what 
it signifies to the interpreter (Heidegger 2003, 51). Second, 
logos means language  (Gadamer 2004b, 59) and  relates to 
Heidegger discourse and letting ‘‘…something be seen through 
speaking…” (Heidegger 2003, 56). The vocal signification of a 
named object connects language as a shared medium of 
expression (Gadamer 2004a, 408; Gadamer 2004b, 59). 
Phenomenology focusses on explaining how the primordial 
thing-in-itself is ‘rooted’ in the events of life and understanding 
what is signified by logos through the ‘‘…name by which META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (2) / 2012 
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something is called…” (Gadamer 2004a, 407). Heidegger and 
Gadamer’s phenomenological inquiry into Being (human 
existence in the world) therefore enabled a rigorous and critical 
questioning of something that had been largely taken for 
granted in philosophy, the primordial understanding of Being 
(Gadamer 2004a).  
Hermeneutics is a term derived from the Greek ‘hermeneutikos’ 
meaning to interpret (Palmer 1969). Hermeneutics promotes 
human potential for understanding the meaning of language to 
expand the infinite possibilities of human thought (Palmer 
1969). Developed from theological interpretations and meaning 
of the Christian Bible hermeneutics aimed to confirm God’s 
authority over human thought (Palmer 1969).  The early 
hermeneutics exercised a discriminating power over texts 
suitability to carry the message of a transcendental wonder 
(Dilthey) demonstrating, rather than human empowerment, 
that interpretation with an ideological bias has the capacity to 
restrict human potential for understanding more fully 
(Alexander and Numbers 2010). What is significant about 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics is his ontological focus (Being) and 
capacity to not only interpret human understanding but 
misunderstanding as a mechanism for effective communication. 
 
Understanding language 
As previously mentioned, the key to investigating Gadamer’s 
concept of understanding is through logos (Gadamer 2004b, 59). 
Logos is the vehicle for communicating with others, and when 
we think and speak we ‘‘…make what is not present manifest 
through …speaking…communicat(ing) everything that he 
means…” (Gadamer 2004a, 391; Gadamer 2004b, 60-61). This 
means that the word triggers a denoted name given to an object 
and a resulting mental image (Gadamer 2004b, 62). When 
thinking of any object we unconsciously join up our internalised 
thoughts within the shared, externalised medium of 
communicating with other people (Gadamer 2004b). Therefore 
the commonality of language ensures a shared acceptance of 
meaning and ability to vocalise thoughts when alone or when 
with other people. That relates to the problem of language; we 
learn to think and use language from the first steps of Paul Regan / Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics 
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cognisance, a familiarising engagement experientially with the 
world and it with us (Aristotle in Gadamer 2004b, 63). This 
allows the interpreter to develop ways of knowing and 
predicting the world through the use of their senses of 
conformity, cohesion and survival within the world (Flinn 
2006). Such predictive abilities mean we are always biased in 
our understanding of the spoken and written language as we 
become consciously aware of language only in unusual 
circumstances (Gadamer 2004b).  
Gadamer suggests three inter-relational points of relevance to 
language and understanding: Firstly, the universality of 
language; every dialogue has the potential for ‘inner infinity,’ 
an ability to reason, project understanding onto another and 
read between the lines. This dialogue may be in the form of a 
reflective journal entry, a research participants’ narrative or 
everyday dialogue in the health and social sciences. A 
questioning mind ensures that language fills in any gaps 
towards a shared understanding (Gadamer 2004b, 68) opening 
up human potential for infinite dialogue with others in a fusion 
of horizons. Secondly, Gadamer refers to the essential 
forgetfulness of language; when losing the meaning of what is 
said there is potential for the ‘‘…real Being of language to 
unfold…” to be reduced (Gadamer 2004b, 64). Gadamer 
develops the ontological (life experiences of the world) 
reflexivity of language as a means of communicating the 
meaning of what others say and write. As will be shown, this 
ontological freedom encompasses historicity,  temporality and 
authenticity through hermeneutic analysis. Lastly, what 
Gadamer called I-lessness. When we speak we speak to someone 
and to our inner selves. When naming the word (in text or 
visually) we enable the unifying effect of language and 
communicating with others (Gadamer 2004b, 65). Gadamer 
suggests there is a presence of spirit evident when using 
language, for example; projecting hesitancy, anxiety, intention 
and attitude. Gadamer refers to this as play in the hermeneutic 
game, a dynamic process of buoyancy, freedom potentiating 
reality and fulfilment of each players understanding. The play 
continues in the subjective inner world of thought and the 
motivation of the interpreter to play the game, to make sense of META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (2) / 2012 
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language as a key factor for understanding experience 
(Gadamer 2004b, 66). I will now expand on these conditions. 
 
Language and text 
The role of the interpreter within Gadamerian hermeneutics 
has a specific characteristic in understanding human potential, 
through the ontic-ontology of Heidegger’s notion of Being 
(Heidegger 2003; Gadamer 2004a).  The word ontology  comes 
from the Greek language meaning the study of Being, reviewed 
by Heidegger for contemporary philosophy by situating Being 
into the average everydayness of life (Heidegger 2003). To 
Heidegger and Gadamer, understanding the concept of Being 
and ‘what it is to be’ human meant that by analysing this most 
fundamental of concepts we can then and only then begin to 
understand how we live and engage in the world through the 
medium of language (Gadamer 2004a; Gadamer 2004b). 
Language delivers pointers to the truth concealed within word 
meaning and reveals that something exists in a (hermeneutic) 
circle of ontological possibilities (Gadamer 2004a).  
Fundamental to Heidegger’s hermeneutic is the notion of the 
human as an existential (worldly) ‘Being,’ referred to as ‘Da-
sein,’ always spelt with a capital D, ‘da’ meaning ‘there’ and 
‘sein’ meaning ‘to be,’ or ‘there-being’ (Heidegger 2003). The 
concept of Dasein lies therefore in the face of something that is. 
Something inevitably has to exist first before it can be 
investigated and Heidegger’s analysis enabled the first step 
towards human understanding of Dasein (Heidegger 2003, 27). 
This complex but also intuitively familiar concept relates to   
when a human being becomes aware of themselves as an 
existent located temporally in time ‘‘...Dasein (therefore) always 
understands….its existence in terms of the possibility of … 
be(ing) itself or not itself...” (Heidegger 2003, 33). Hence, we are 
aware and yet unaware of ourselves, ‘forgetting’ as we go about 
our daily lives, a pre-ontological awareness of existing through 
the experiences of everyday life (Heidegger 2003). Heidegger’s 
question enabled a single minded attempt to analyse the 
human life experience as ontologically explicit and objectifiable 
as possible (Gadamer 2004b).  Paul Regan / Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics 
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Back in those ‘‘heady days” of Heidegger’s radical 1920’s 
lectures, Heidegger’s work was a ‘‘…summons of existence 
itself...” towards authenticity (Karl Jaspers in Gadamer 2004b, 
139). This new kind of philosophy aimed to remind humans of 
the choice of authenticity as an antidote to ‘falling’ (and 
‘throwness’) which relates to being superficial when with other 
people. We risk becoming just one of many, a risk that reduces 
human self-awareness and understanding of our potential. By 
being reminded of the possibility of authentic choice we may 
search to objectify the habits of everyday life by revealing what 
may otherwise remain hidden consciously or unconsciously 
within language and dialogue (Gadamer 2004b, 140).  
Gadamer suggests hermeneutics is not a method but a fluid set 
of guiding principles aiding the human search for truth in the 
concealed forgetfulness of language. The analytic of Dasein 
means that research participants’ narrative of their life 
experience, of say cancer care is in a sense not only their 
individual experience but also experience valued in relation to 
the universality of the Dasein concept. Hence, the interpreting 
researcher too is analysing the universality of experience 
applied into Dasein’s analytic which they too share as a fellow 
human beings (Creswell 2007). Asking obvious yet profound 
questions of Dasein reinforces a reflective philosophy. However 
a difficulty is that despite humans being the only entity able to 
study and name itself ontically, our unique complexity means 
we aren’t like other entities at all, because we have language 
(Heidegger 2003).  
 
Fusion of horizons – the hermeneutic circle 
It is the naming phenomena within language that places 
restrictions on language which Gadamer (2004a) endeavours to 
illuminate, arguing interpretations derived from such 
understandings always involve a fusion of horizons. From the 
familiar to the foreign all interpretations are derived from a 
basic level of understanding or pre-judgment. When accepting 
the inner world of subjectivity and searching for the meaning of 
interpretation Dasein inevitably conceals the truth of language 
and about life (Gadamer 2004a; 2004b). Hence, the reader is 
part of this fusion.  META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (2) / 2012 
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Gadamer’s dialogical approach to hermeneutic text is suggested 
to go beyond the author’s (or research participants transcribed 
narrative) meaning (2004a). Gadamer agrees with Chladenius 
that the reader and author ‘‘…doesn’t have to know the real 
meaning of what he has written…” because it is the process of 
interpretation that counts in the search for meaning of the 
written word (Gadamer 2004a, 296). The text is re-awakened by 
the interpreter making sense of what has been written (2004a). 
The interpreter, however, needs to be aware of the hermeneutic 
circle, not merely to understand what the author (or research 
participant) meant; life experience (history) and use of 
language, but also asking how the words resonate with the 
interpreter. The issue therefore is not about finding the truth 
the author wrote about but realising the truth it has for the 
reader, how it becomes alive for the interpreter (Gadamer 
2004a). 
The process starts when text changes the spoken language into 
an ‘‘…enduring and fixed expression of life…” the experience of 
making sense of text always includes application; listening, 
observing, testing, judging, challenging, reflecting and looking 
for any bias whilst being-with-others (Gadamer 2004a, 389).  
When reading the interpreter is helped by humans shared 
capacity to deal with more than one perception at a time, 
experienced in parallel with each other before the most likely 
idea is grasped and gains clarity (Gadamer 2004a, 293). It is 
this constant cycle of new projections and movement which 
enhances understanding and interpretation of the meaning of 
language (Gadamer 2004a, 293). When reading, our eyes need 
to be open to the newness of the text in order to search for 
meaning (2004a). The hermeneutic circle runs along the text 
like a rhythm, open to my anticipation, my pre-conceptions, 
prejudices and judgements (2004a). The reader needs to be 
aware what guides their understanding and anticipation of the 
completed speech and text, challenging hasty conclusions in 
order to be open to more possibilities. Therefore, the language 
used within the narrative acts as a middle ground between a 
search for understanding and agreement between the text and 
the interpreter (2004a).  Paul Regan / Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics 
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Gadamer suggests all interpretations are derived from a basic 
level of understanding or pre-judgment and accepting the inner 
world of subjectivity (Gadamer 2004a,b). People rarely know 
about other people’s views unless asked and instead will guess 
or make assumptions. Gadamer’s view of the shared human 
experience as an ‘application in the moment’ of the hermeneutic 
circle was preceded forty years earlier by Walter Pater’s 
observation ‘‘…for the grave reader…the word…reference is 
rarely content to die to thought precisely at the right 
moment…linger(s) awhile, stirring a long brainwave behind it 
of perhaps quite alien associations…” (Iser 1972, 212). 
Wolfgang Iser’s reception theory relates to Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics; the act of reading enables an 
inevitable consciousness raising activity. The interpreter’s 
expectation of the text gives them the chance to ‘formulate the 
unformulated’ and by being motivated to read they remain open 
to reveal the unexpected even if alien to the interpreter because 
the surprise of the text challenges the illusion of pre-supposed 
expectations (Iser 1972, 212).  
 
The alien and familiar information 
In parallel with the early examples of hermeneutic application, 
what is crucial is the process of identifying and linking the 
alien with the familiar  information, selectively focussing the 
interpreters search for new perspectives (2004b, 4). This 
depends on his enthusiasm to be open to new possibilities 
(Gadamer 2004b, 4). The alien aspects of text are what is the 
unknown, challenging the interpreter’s familiar worldly 
horizons that assimilates old knowledge into new 
understanding, even if difficult to understand, especially 
relevant when reading the technical language of philosophy. 
There is a process of suspension as the ‘alien’ and ‘unfamiliar’ 
text run side by side until new understanding emerges 
(Gadamer 2004a, 269). Gadamer (2004b, 4) refers to two modes 
of experiencing alienation in our concrete experiences; the 
aesthetic and historical consciousness. In both cases 
judgements are based on the validity of judgement, 
characterising our sense of art in general being dependant on 
time, cultural significance, resonance and authority. The META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (2) / 2012 
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alienation of historical consciousness is the art of maintaining 
an objective and critical distance from events of the past. As 
soon as language is written down it becomes the ultimate form 
of self-alienation and overcoming it is the highest task of 
understanding (Gadamer 2004a, 392). For example; if I wrote 
about a reflective experience as a researcher or when returning 
to a participant’s narrative account at a later date there would 
be a raised consciousness of my own history, experience and 
perception of language used. The sense of now being opened up 
to new interpretation and understanding gained through 
temporal distance; reading the text, identifying and revealing 
assumptions, the reader involved and observing the unfamiliar 
text held as fiction enabling the ‘…realities of the text as they 
happen…’ to unfold (Iser 1972, 221). Understanding therefore 
oscillates between finding ‘consistency’ with pre-conceptions 
and new but alien ideas (Iser 1972). The interpreter has to lift 
the restrictions placed consciously or not onto the meaning of 
the text itself. In seeking balance, meaning and understanding 
of text needs to start out with certain expectations which allows 
for what is integral to the aesthetic experience and engaging 
surprise, frustration and challenge (Iser 1972).  
 
Authenticity 
Gadamer opens up the enquiry by articulating the situatedness 
of Dasein and what is involved in the process of understanding. 
When human beings are ‘being-in-the-world’ Dasein is aware of 
the world and immersed within it, a unitary phenomenon of 
sharing the world with other people (the ‘they-self’). We are 
‘thrown’ into the world whether we like it or not, with a variety 
of resources (or not) for survival, competition and co-operation 
(Gadamer 2004a). This shared ‘concern’ for the world is by 
caring, thinking, doing, contemplating theories of 
understanding (presence-at-hand), and making use of 
something such as language (Gadamer 2004a). 
An interpreter’s reading and understanding of narrative falls 
against this backdrop of understanding due to the constant but 
necessary state of ‘being-with-others.’ Despite a human being 
orientated to develop their own potential the effects of being 
surrounded by other people relates to states of ‘in-authenticity’ Paul Regan / Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics 
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and ‘authenticity’ (Heidegger 2003; Gadamer 2004a). Aspects of 
life are embraced without question to differentiate Dasein from 
the masses (Gadamer 2004a). In so doing, in-authenticity refers 
to Dasein’s un-awakened state and sense of themselves in the 
world, in particular when accepting social norms, personal 
traits, habits, beliefs, values and prejudices of society (2004a). 
Authenticity becomes relevant whilst searching for meaning 
and interpretation of life resulting in fundamental questions 
being raised when attempting to understand the individual self; 
what values, beliefs, pre-suppositions affect Dasein’s openness 
to engage with the text, even if their views are entrenched and 
ideological. The effects of other people on Dasein’s worldview 
questions the state of authenticity and being motivated to 
continue in fear of exposure (2004a).  
Gadamer challenges Heidegger’s notion of Dasein’s authenticity 
when removed from the distracting effect of other people or mit-
dasein (with others) (2004a). His view of inter-subjectivity is 
that other people do not limit an understanding of Dasein 
(ourselves) which is evident when turning to other people for 
advice, feedback and ideas. First, Gadamer suggests testing 
ideas on other people, such as in research process, is part of the 
process of learning to understand the prejudices informing our 
own judgements. Second, we realise through dialogue that 
others have good cause to disagree with us and we find new 
ways to accommodate new thinking (2004a). A central principle 
therefore of Gadamer’s work is holding oneself open to 
conversation with others (Palmer and Michelfelder 1989). This 
may demonstrate not only where Dasein went right or wrong 
but also shows the true elements of Dasein itself (Gadamer 
2004a).  
 
Fore-understanding  
Gadamer suggests recognising the interpreting readers 
prejudice gives hermeneutics its ‘‘…real thrust…” (Gadamer 
2004a, 272). The (interpreter) working out their own pre-
suppositions (fore-having, fore-sight, fore-conception) should be 
the ‘‘…first, last and constant task…” when attempting to 
understand the relevant issues (Gadamer 2004a, 269). The 
romantic enlightenment brought with it the discrediting of META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (2) / 2012 
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prejudice due to the Cartesian doubt of accepting nothing as 
certain and a ‘methodology to match’ (Gadamer 2004a, 274). 
Gadamer identifies the concept of prejudice or praejudicium as 
a good starting point to affect the hermeneutic circle, defining a 
temporal judgment that is ‘‘…rendered before all the elements 
that determine a situation have been finally examined…” 
(Gadamer 2004a,  269). This is in contrast to health and social 
care practitioners professionally socialised to believe in the 
Rogerian notion of being non-judgemental, however it refers 
also to developing an objective awareness of belief systems. The 
term praejudicium refers to judgements, pre-supposition, bias, 
prejudices from cultural traditions, whether positive or 
negative (Gadamer 2004b, 31). They are necessary 
springboards towards better understanding where even vague 
notions of a texts meaning are important because they ensure 
the familiarity of words and ‘construal’ of its meaning (291). 
The ‘expectation’ of what has been experienced before gives the 
interpreter a working hypothesis from which to further develop 
understanding (291). 
When returning to the text (as an interpreting researcher), 
understanding may be heightened by the temporal distance and 
time to think about how the text makes sense with what one 
already knows. Gadamer suggests therefore that understanding 
is ultimately self-understanding and any unchallenged pre-
suppositions only serve to maintain a restrictive interpretation 
of the text (Gadamer 2004a, 251). The search for understanding 
requires the interpreter’s awareness of their own bias and pre-
conceptions affecting the habit of projecting a meaning for the 
text as a whole as soon as initial meaning is grasped (Gadamer 
2004a, 269). The main issue therefore identifies that in order to 
read a text the interpreter has to have an understanding of 
their own expectations about what a word or phrase means in 
relation to the parts and the whole of meaning (2004a).  
The constant task of understanding is being aware of pre-
conceptions, naïve hypothesising, self awareness, whilst being 
simultaneously open to other options which ‘‘…emerge side by 
side…” until the meaning becomes clearer (Gadamer 2004a, 
269). A search for understanding is therefore the working out of 
pre-conceptions, the openness of the hermeneutic process Paul Regan / Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics 
297 
 
 
overcoming the limitations of bias (2004a). Gadamer recalls the 
hermeneutic rule inspired by ancient rhetoric ‘‘…that we must 
understand the whole in terms of the detail…” and vica versa 
(291). In doing so the reader initiates the hermeneutic circle 
(Schleiermacher in Gadamer 2004a, 291). The engagement of 
the hermeneutic circle therefore has objective and subjective 
resonance to the interpreter as the single word connects to a 
sentence belonging to the context of the author’s whole life and 
work (Schleiermacher in Gadamer 2004a, 291). The text is more 
like a real conversation between the author and reader and like 
any real conversation hermeneutics binds both together, not 
because the text is a tool for reaching understanding but 
because of the interpreter’s motivation to engage in the 
conversation until understanding is satisfactorily 
accommodated (Gadamer 2004a, 389). If one fails to understand 
the nuances of narrative meaning, then the hermeneutic 
conversation fails to reach its full potential to grasp the whole 
of meaning, with the interpreter’s own understanding 
remaining at a fixed level (2004a).  
 
Habermas and Gadamer 
Gadamer suggested enhancing human objectivity and 
understanding Dasein can be found in the pre-requisite 
conditions of historicity and prejudice (Piercey 2004, 260). This 
was questioned by Jurgen Habermas (1971) suggesting it was 
naïve to claim that the hermeneutic circle could reveal all fore-
structures of prejudice affecting new interpretations (Ricoeur 
1991; Gadamer 2004b, 31). For Habermas enquiry should not 
be subject to the restrictive authority of tradition (historicity) 
because humans are conditioned by a variety of interests and 
‘‘…basic orientations rooted in specific fundamental conditions 
of the possible reproduction and self-constitution of the 
species…” (Habermas 1971, 176). Enquiry is essentially the 
working out of ideological illusions through the notion of 
tradition [historicity] which reduces the ability for critique 
(176).  To Habermas the ‘‘…legitimacy of prejudice…validated 
by tradition…conflicts with…the power of reflection…which 
…reject(s) the claim of traditions…authority and knowledge do 
not converge…” (Habermas 1980, 170). Ricoeur entered into the META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (2) / 2012 
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debate by suggesting Habermas’s critique of ideologies and 
theory of interests hinged on the same pre-suppositions as 
hermeneutics and tradition. Habermas’s critique was rather 
incoherent and hypocritical by wrongly assuming Gadamer 
meant tradition as an acceptance of what is past without 
critique, the objectification of prejudice the ‘‘…profoundest aim 
of discourse…” (Ricoeur 1991, 299).  Gadamer’s response was to 
suggest that some pre-suppositions are actually accurate, so it 
is up to the reader to identify the fusion of horizons and shared 
understanding of text or speech and issues are entirely 
dependent on engaging openly with text and dialogue within 
the hermeneutic circle.   
 
Historicity 
To Gadamer, tradition and history are never settled or correctly 
interpreted but understood by the interpreter’s ever changing 
horizon (2004a). The profound concept of historicity and 
understanding is that we are thrown into a world that has a 
historical context, which becomes better understood as Dasein 
matures in time (2004a). We are composed of this world and 
context, our essence is already in this all surrounding and 
ancient world, temporally and unavoidably not of our own 
making (2004a). We are born with a past even as we begin to 
know we exist and have the ability to think and wonder 
adapting to the world as it is. This is evident by the phrase the 
‘biological clock’ which ticks away long before we are aware of 
our own mortality. Therefore, we study history in so far as we 
ourselves are historical (2004a). This reduces the risk of being 
self absorbed and forgetting about history whilst also allowing 
us to remain naive and re-present the past into the present and 
future (Gadamer 2004a).  
Dasein’s throwness into historicity ensures the past as 
potential leads at all times to Dasein’s futurity with the sharing 
of cultural information and learning from others ensuring a 
sense of belonging in the high stakes of social competition 
(Gadamer 2004a, 252; Flinn 2006). Cultural information is 
what Heidegger and Gadamer refers to as Dasein’s historicality 
(2004a). However, Gadamer disagrees with Heidegger by 
suggesting the real purpose of Dasein is to co- operate for Paul Regan / Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics 
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mutual benefit with other Dasein [mitsein] (Gadamer 2004a). 
Dasein’s awareness of tradition; the individual and shared 
historical past, present and future identifies Dasein’s innate 
need for protection in the human family in the form of intense 
parenting; learning through developing social relationships, 
being taught how to care and love, taught how to predict risk 
and threat from others (Flinn 2006). This is evident in the 
phenomenon of plastic neural pruning (an infant’s brain 
changes) when adapting to the local community, such as its 
language, to name a few (Flinn 2006). The linguistic tradition 
enables the ‘handing down’ of traditional information of 
relevance to the interpreter’s frame of reference and how what 
is read, written, spoken or heard is interpreted (Gadamer 
2004a). Language therefore enables the information process to 
become ontologically specific to the interpreter, depending on 
the culture (Bildung) to be shared, learnt and accommodated 
(2004a).  
 
Temporality 
Gadamer proposed that the interpreter’s own historicity and 
temporality affects all interpretation of speech and text (2004a). 
The transient nature of speech pragmatically moves on when 
the message is revealed with meaning resonating within the 
interpreter’s own existing temporal understanding (2004a). 
What (information) is handed down culturally needs to be 
meaningful in order to be accommodated for future use (2004a). 
Perhaps the naivety of using the ‘superiority’ of the present to 
view the past means there is no such thing as the present 
perspective but a constantly changing horizon of future and 
past (2004a). Here and now time resonates due to the effect of 
immediacy and only when it fades into the past can true 
meaning be acknowledged (Gadamer 2004a). What has gone 
before and how the present is interpreted affects Dasein’s 
temporal future and being authentically aware means engaging 
with past reflective experiences and opening up retrospective 
analysis to inform not only Dasein’s past but the present and 
future life (2004a). This parallels the experience of reading 
Gadamer’s body of work being more clearly understood through 
subsequent readings and over time revealing the temporal field META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (2) / 2012 
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of historicity itself (Ricoeur 1991). Temporality, therefore 
becomes the supportive ground in which the process of the past 
and present are rooted; ‘time’ the productive possibility of 
custom and tradition aiding understanding by illuminating 
what presents itself (Heidegger 2003; Gadamer 2004a).  
Contrary to contemporary ideas of memory recall, Gadamer 
(2004a, 290) suggests the passage of time actually promotes 
understanding and objective analysis of experiences by a 
process of ‘temporal distance,’ when feelings and phenomena 
associated with an experience become more distant. An 
example may be when returning to a reflective diary entry after 
a difficult experience and issues become clearer with the 
distance of time without the added distraction of emotion. This 
is what Gadamer refers to as the ‘‘…hermeneutic significance of 
temporal distance…” (Gadamer 2004a, 290). The process 
therefore reciprocates through the hermeneutic circle, as a 
thread runs along the text as fore-meaning becomes manifest in 
relation to what is read (Piercey 2004, 260).  
 
Playing  
In order to address criticism of hermeneutics inadequacy in 
dealing with entrenched ideology (Habermas 1980), Gadamer 
referred to the concept of play, taken from aesthetics of 
experiencing art (Gadamer 2004a, 102). What is important in 
this process is the mode of Dasein in play itself, play fulfills its 
purpose if the player ‘‘…loses himself in the play…” and is not a 
‘spoilsport’ (102-3). Playing is Dasein’s motivation to be open to 
possibilities and suspend disbelief and still read on. Notably, 
Gadamer (2004a, 103) reinforces the metaphorical use of the 
word play with the everyday meaning of 
‘‘...language…perform(ing) in advance the abstraction...that is 
the task of conceptual analysis…” The next process involves 
time to think and reflect with the concept of play occurring as 
both interpreter and author wish to play whilst both knowing 
about the game in motion. The author produces work to be read 
(or transcribed narrative), as a dialogue with others risking 
scrutiny, agreement or otherwise. It is his work as it goes to 
print, his opinion temporally and historically informed, with 
the understanding that his future opinions may change or Paul Regan / Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics 
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reinforce the importance of the game itself over the subjectivity 
of the players (Gadamer 2004a; 2004b). Aware of the subject, 
the players as in any game have a choice when, where, with 
whom and for how long to play it, returning freely to it in future 
engagements (temporally) with the text. If a player comes from 
another game, they are filled with their own ideas (tradition); 
they may be resistant or even hostile (ideologically) but become 
motivated by the game itself. In time, disbelieving ideas may 
dissolve so long as there is game on (Gadamer 2004a). Play 
therefore has a personal and scholastic resonance, opening up 
the possibilities to shape new understanding. 
 
In conclusion 
Gadamer’s concepts of pre-supposition, inter-subjectivity, 
authenticity, temporality, tradition and history have been 
discussed in relation to reading, understanding and 
interpretation. The centrality of the health and social care 
researcher in qualitative methodology ensures that the same 
methods are employed when interpreting Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics and research participants’ 
narrative. Gadamer’s work has been criticised as 
phenomenological description by the legal historian Emilio 
Betti (Gadamer 2004a, 512) but the response was clear and 
precise. Seeking to analyse and articulate not what ought to 
happen as a methodology but what does happen and ‘is the case’ 
of hermeneutic analysis. The conditions Gadamer expands upon 
can all be applied in the reflective actions of an interpreter’s 
experience with the spoken word and (transcribed) written 
language. Gadamer realised ‘‘…something crooked should be 
straightened…” namely the folly of scientific methodology 
which does not take into consideration the human conditions of 
historicity and prejudice (Gadamer 2004a, 559). In contrast to a 
method of certainty, Gadamer proposed that out of the 
interpreter’s uncertainty and notion of play; prejudice, fusion of 
horizons and temporal distancing to name but a few key 
concepts, the interpreter/ researcher needs to work out any pre-
suppositions they may have as the ‘‘…first, last and constant 
task…” of the hermeneutic method (Gadamer 2004a, 269). In 
doing so the process opens up interpretation to the many META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (2) / 2012 
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alternate possibilities of the text and towards new 
understanding. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Alexander, D. R. and Numbers, R. L. (eds). 2010. Biology and 
Ideology: From Descartes to Dawkins. University of Chicago 
Press: Chicago. 
Creswell, J. W. 2007. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: 
Choosing Among Five Traditions. Second edition. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Flinn, M. V. 2006. ‘‘Evolution and Ontogeny of Stress Response 
to Social Challenges in the Human Child.” Developmental 
Review 26: 138–174. 
Gadamer, H. G. 2004a. Truth and Method. Second edition. 
London: Sheed and Ward Stagbooks. 
Gadamer, H. G. 2004b. Philosophical Hermeneutics. Translated 
and edited by D. E. Linge. Second edition, Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 
Habermas, J. 1971. Knowledge and Human Interests. 
Translated by J. Shapiro.  Boston: Beacon Press. 
Habermas, J. 1980. ‘‘The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality.” 
In  Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, 
Philosophy, and Critique, edited by Joseph Bleicher. London 
and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Heidegger, M. 1992. History of the Concept of Time: 
Prolegamena. Translated by Theodore Kisiel. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
Heidegger, M. 2003. Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Iser, W. 1972. ‘‘The Reading Process: A Phenomenological 
Approach.” New Literary Theory 3: 279-299.  
Palmer, R. E. 1969. Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in 
Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. Paul Regan / Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics 
303 
 
 
Palmer, R. E., and D. Michelfelder. 1989. ‘‘Text and 
Interpretation.” In Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-
Derrida encounter. Albany: State University of New York Press.  
Piercey, R. 2004. ‘‘Ricoeur's Account of Tradition and the 
Gadamer–Habermas Debate. September.” Human Studies 27 
(3): 259-280. 
Ricoeur, P. 1991. From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics. 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
 
 
Paul Regan is a senior lecturer in adult nursing at the University of Central 
Lancashire. His background is in adult, mental health nursing and health 
visiting. Paul Regan has written about reflective practice,  group work, clinical 
supervision, the use of annotation in higher education, practice development and 
innovation, peri-natal depression, the United Kingdom healthcare reforms and 
the market economy and promoting patients right to vote. Paul has a keen 
interest in European philosophy and phenomenology applied to the experiences of 
nursing practice. 
 
Address:  
Paul Regan 
University of Central Lancashire 
Brook building, Victoria St 
Preston, PR1 2HE 
United Kingdom 
Phone: +44 1772893616 
E-mail: PJRegan@uclan.ac.uk 